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It is a commonplace nowadays in fallacy literature that not all instances of informal 
fallacies are really wrong. Reasons vary. In “Interpretative dilemmas,” David Botting 
argues that informal fallacies of relevance (and equivocation) are not in fact genuine 
cases of fallacy at all. This is because in interpreting an argument, and before 
subjecting it to logical analysis, the analyst faces a choice: she can be uncharitable, in 
which case she’ll accuse the arguer of incompetence or deceit (and so of not 
arguing); or she can be charitable, and interpret the fallacious argument as 
something else, such as a demand.  
 I do not have any serious objections to the discussion of how various 
instances of fallacies of relevance (section 3) can be viewed as not fallacious. It is, I 
think, generally true that such fallacies are over diagnosed. I do however have a 
quibble with the idea that charity requires us to construct the best possible iteration 
of someone’s argument. I think it’s possible, in other words, to be too charitable. Put 
another way, charity may not require us to be nice. From a purely formal 
perspective, nearly every inference, however stretched, has its own peculiar logic: 
with enough charity, no one could ever make a fallacious argument of the kind 
standard logic text examples mean to illustrate. One often hears criticisms of the 
Standard Treatment along these very lines: viz., such examples are deprived of 
context, the arguments could be interpreted in different and more charitable ways, 
or some of the arguments are not really even arguments.  
 Fair enough. But people do, as a matter of fact, make horrible arguments they 
mean to be interpreted as arguments. Legions of so-called climate change skeptics, 
for instance, meant to infer from Al Gore’s electricity usage to the falsity of the thesis 
that human activity causes climate change. If they didn’t mean to make that 
inference, they at least meant others to draw it at their behest.  
 Charity, I think, also requires that we respect a person’s intentions, however 
inadequately realized. People who make fallacious arguments are very often trying 
their best to argue, just as novice violinists are trying to play. The arguers are trying 
to line up reasons they think, however wrongly at times, to imply some conclusion. 
Though we may indeed have a choice to interpret their arguments as not arguments, 
and so not fallacious, we may be passing on an opportunity to improve the person’s 
skills as an arguer. More importantly, we may also be passing on a chance to 
evaluate the person’s reasoning capabilities. If the various straw men, ad hominems, 
and ad populums of John Q. Firebrand evade our scrutiny, he just may get elected. 
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I do not mean to suggest that Botting thinks the worst instances of these 
kinds of relevance issues are permissible. He thinks rather that logic wastes its time 
on a matter beyond its borders. But that’s just the challenge, I think, of informal 
logic: to provide a systematic, or better quasi-systematic, method for interpreting 
and evaluating the utterances and arguments that people tend to make.  
